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Abstract— This paper considers off-street parking for the
cruising vehicles of transportation network companies (TNCs)
to reduce the traffic congestion. We propose a novel business
that integrates the shared parking service into the TNC
platform. In the proposed model, the platform (a) provides
interfaces that connect passengers, drivers and garage operators
(commercial or private garages); (b) determines the ride fare,
driver payment, and parking rates; (c) matches passengers to
TNC vehicles for ride-hailing services; and (d) matches vacant
TNC vehicles to unoccupied parking garages to reduce the
cruising cost. A queuing-theoretic model is proposed to capture
the matching process of passengers, drivers, and parking
garages. A market-equilibrium model is developed to capture
the incentives of the passengers, drivers, and garage operators.
An optimization-based model is formulated to capture the
optimal pricing of the TNC platform. Through a realistic case
study, we show that the proposed business model will offer a
Pareto improvement that benefits all stakeholders, which leads
to higher passenger surplus, higher drivers surplus, higher
garage operator surplus, higher platform profit, and reduced
traffic congestion.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of smartphones has enabled transporta-
tion network companies (TNCs), such as Uber, Lyft and
Didi, to offer real-time matching services for passengers
and drivers, which significantly reduces the search frictions
of the ride-hailing market. These emerging businesses have
deeply transformed the landscape of urban transportation.
Today, Uber has completed more than 10 billion trips with
3.9 million active drivers in over 65 countries [1]. It was
estimated in [2] that Uber generated $6.8B consumer surplus
in the US in 2016.
Recently, the rapid growth of TNCs starts to exhibit
externalities that negatively impact the transportation system.
Among the various concerns, a major one is the “cruising
congestion” caused by TNC vehicles. The TNC business
model crucially relies on a very short passenger waiting time,
which in turn depends on a large number of available but idle
drivers. In New York City, TNC drivers spend more than
40% of their time empty and cruising for passengers [3].
This underutilziation of vehicles not only leads to low driver
incomes, but also created more cruising traffic that congested
the city streets which are already saturated. In Manhattan,
for-hire vehicles make up nearly 30% of all traffic [4].
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One way to address the cruising congestion is by reg-
ulatory intervention [5], [6]. In 2019, the New York City
Taxi and Limousine Commission (NYCTLC) required TNC
platforms to cap their time cruising without passenger below
31% out of all driving time in Manhattan core at peak hours
(currently 41% industry-wide) [4]. This regulation aims to
motivate TNCs to better utilize their drivers’ resources and
reduce the cruising congestion. However, it was overturned
by the Supreme Court of State of New York [7], claiming
that the citys cruising cap was “arbitrary and capricious“.
Another way to curb cruising congestion is by parking
the vehicles when there is no passenger. Xu et al. [8]
studied the allocation of road space to on-street parking
for vacant TNC vehicles to reduce cruising congestion.
The optimal parking provision strategy was proposed to
address the trade-off between reduced cruising traffic and
reduced road spaces. Ruch et al. [9] considered a mobility-
on-demand system with a fleet of vehicles and a number of
free parking spaces. A coordinated parking operating policy
was proposed to meet the parking capacity constraint with
minimum increase in vehicle distance traveled and minimum
impact on the service level. Kondor et al. [10] investigated
the minimum number of parking spaces needed for the
mobility-on-demand services and analyzed the relationship
between parking provision and traffic congestion. Lam et al
[11] proposed a coordinated parking management strategy
for electric autonomous vehicles to provide vehicle-to-grid
services. Jian et al [12] considered an operator that integrates
car-sharing and parking sharing platforms to provide bundled
services (car and parking) to travelers.
In this paper, we propose a novel business model that
integrates ride-hailing services and parking services into
a single ride-sourcing platform (i.e., TNC). The platform
(a) provides interfaces that connect passengers, drivers and
garage operators (commercial or private garages); (b) deter-
mines the ride fare, driver payment, and parking rates; and (c)
executes two matching processes for the market participants,
where passengers are matched to TNC vehicles for ride-
hailing services, and vacant TNC vehicles are matched to
unoccupied parking garages to reduce the cruising cost. Our
key observation is as follows: regular parking demands are
typically much longer than TNC parking demands (e.g., 1h
vs 8min [4]). Based on the SF-Park data [13], there are
inevitably gaps between two long-term parking customers
subsequently taking the same parking space. The proposed
business model enables the garage owners to fill these gaps
using short-term TNC parking demands in real-time, which
only takes the spaces that would have been unused if they are
not provided for TNC parking. By unlocking the potential
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
15
89
9v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  3
1 J
ul 
20
20
of these underutilzied parking garages, the proposed business
model will benefit passengers, drivers, garage operators, and
the TNC platform without affecting regular parking demand.
The key contributions of the paper are summarized below:
• We proposed a novel business model that integrated
parking services into the TNC platform. Based on the
principle of sharing economy, the proposed solution
will increase passenger surplus, driver surplus, garage
profit, and TNC profit. In the meanwhile, it will reduce
the cruising congestion without affecting the regular
parking demand.
• We developed a market equilibrium model that captures
the incentives of the passengers, drivers, garage opera-
tors, and the TNC platform. A queuing theoretic model
is proposed to capture the dynamics of passengers,
drivers, and the parking garages, and an optimization
model is formulated for the TNC platform to jointly
derive the optimal prices of the ride-hailing service and
the parking service.
• We validated the proposed model through numerical
simulations. The impacts of the proposed parking ser-
vices on the ride-hailing market are assessed quanti-
tively based on real San Francisco data.
II. THE BUSINESS MODEL
We consider a transportation market with the TNC plat-
form, a group of passengers and drivers, and a number of
(private or commercial) parking garages distributed across
the transportation network. Based on the principle of sharing
economy, the TNC platform offers app-based interfaces that
provide on-demand services to both passengers, drivers and
the garage operators. Passengers can request on-demand
ride services through the user app. Drivers can log on/off
the app to provide ride services depending on their own
work schedules. Garage operators can offer or withdraw any
number of parking spots at any time depending on their
operational strategies. Each ride is initiated by a service
request from the passenger. The platform then matches the
passenger with a nearby driver, who delivers the passenger
to a pre-specified destination. After the passenger alights,
instead of cruising on the street, the driver is dispatched
to a nearby parking garage1, where he stays for a few
minutes (e.g. 5-8 min [4]) until the next passenger arrives.
Throughout this process, a few transactions take place: (a)
each passenger pays a ride fare to the platform based on
the trip distance and trip time; (b) each driver receives a
payment from the platform based on the passenger fare and
the commission rate; and (c) each garage operator receives a
payment from the platform based on the accumulated TNC
parking time at a per minute rate. We assume that all rates
are determined by the platform, and all transactions are
centrally processed through the cloud. In this case, there is
no direct payment transfer among passengers, drivers and
garage operators. The system diagram is shown in Figure 1.
A few important remarks are in order:
1We will show that on average, drivers benefit from following the platform
dispatch. The spatial heterogeneity among drivers is left for further research.
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Fig. 1. The system diagram for the transportation market.
• We argue that the parking service should be provided
by the TNC platform rather than other third-party plat-
forms. This is because the sharing-economy model for
parking services requires the platform to (a) acquire the
real-time location of TNC vehicles, and (b) accumulate
a large number of users on both demand side (TNC ve-
hicles) and supply side (parking garage) of the market.
TNC is a natural candidate for running the proposed
business model2.
• The proposed business model aims to unlock the poten-
tial of the underutilized parking garages, so that parking
services complement the existing garage operation in-
stead of substituting it. It is crucial to observe that each
TNC vehicle only parks for 5-8 minutes before the next
ride request. This enables the garage operator to fill the
gap between regular long-term parking demands (e.g.,
2 hours) using the short-term TNC parking demands
(e.g., 5-8 min). The garage operator could offer more
parking spaces to the TNC platform when it predicts
that the regular long-term parking demand is low, and
withdraw the parking services from the platform at any
time when the regular demand is high. In this case, the
parking spaces offered to the TNC platform would have
been unoccupied if it is not reserved for TNC parking.
Therefore, the proposed business model will not impact
the regular parking demand3.
• Based on the above discussion, the marginal cost of
the parking spaces offered to the TNC platform are
minimum. This enables TNC vehicles to enjoy a heavy
parking discount compared to other parking demands.
The rates of the TNC parking services are determined
by the platform, while the rates for other regular parking
demands are determined by the garage operator. These
two parking services are operated in parallel. The garage
operator determines the allocation of the parking spaces
in each service to maximize his profit.
• The proposed business model requires minimum hard-
ware and software modification on the existing parking
infrastructure. The TNC platform will develop an app-
based interface for the garage operator. The garage oper-
ator will communicate with the TNC platform to enable
smooth entry and exit of TNC vehicles. Parking data
2We will show that TNC makes more profit by offering parking services.
3Garage operators needs to reserve easy-access parking spaces for TNC
vehicles to accommodate their short stay.
should be submitted periodically through the interface
for financial settlements.
III. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
Ride-hailing market is typically formulated as a two-sided
market where the platform matches the supply side (driver)
and the demand side (passenger) to make a profit. When
parking service is integrated, the TNC platform faces a
much more complicated market structure that involves two
matching processes (i.e., matching passengers to drivers,
matching drivers to parking garages) and three sides (i.e.,
passenger, drivers, and parking garages). In this case, the
platform determines the ride fare, driver payment, and the
parking rate to attract both passengers, drivers and the garage
operators. These platform decisions will affect the decision
making of passengers, drivers and the garage operators,
which in turn determines the profit of the TNC platform.
Below we present a mathematical model to capture the
incentives of these market participants.
A. The Matching Process
Consider a ride-hailing market that consists of N drivers,
K parking slots, and a group of randomly arriving pas-
sengers. Upon arrival, each passengers immediately joins a
queue and waits for he next available driver to be dispatched.
After passenger alights, each driver is dispatched to a parking
garage (if available) until the next ride request arrives (driver
relocation is neglected in the aggregate model). This can
be captured by a continuous-time queuing process where
passengers are modeled as “jobs” and drivers are modeled as
“servers”. We assume that the arrival process of passengers
is Poisson with rate λ > 0, and the service rate is exponential
with rate µ. This leads to an M/M/N queue, where the
average number of idle TNC vehicles (vehicles without a
passenger) is NI = N − λ/µ.
B. Passenger Incentives
Passengers choose whether to take TNC based on the
travel cost of the TNC ride. We define the total travel cost
of the TNC ride as the weighted sum of the ride fare pf and
the waiting time tw:
c = αtw + pf . (1)
where α represents the trade off between time and money,
the ride fare pf is determined by the platform, and the
passenger waiting time can be decomposed into two parts: (a)
from the ride being requested to a vehicle being dispatched
(denoted as t1), and (b) from the vehicle being dispatched to
the passenger being picked up (denoted as t2). The former
represents the waiting time in the M/M/N queue, and the
latter represents the travel time between the passenger and
the nearest idle TNC vehicle. We assume that the total
waiting time tw = t1+t2 depends on the density of idle TNC
vehicles NI . With slight abuse of notation, we denote tw as
a function tw(N − λ/µ), then the arrival rate of passengers
is captured by:
λ = Fp
(
αtw(N − λ/µ) + pf
)
, (2)
We assume that Fp(·) is a decreasing and continuously
differentiable function, so that higher travel cost c indicates
lower arrival rate of TNC passengers.
C. Driver Incentives
Drivers decide whether to join TNC based on the net
hourly wage offered by the platform. The net hourly wage
of the TNC driver is defined as the gross wage wg minus the
vehicle expenses. The gross wag wg is set by the platform
[5], determined as the passenger ride fare minus the platform
commission. The vehicle expenses consist of a one-time fixed
cost (such as vehicle registration, maintenance, insurance)
and the variable costs (such as gas expenses, work time,
etc). Here we neglect the one-time fixed expenses since the
fixed costs are discounted over the long term (e.g. 1 year)
and does not affect the short-term driver supply in the TNC
market (e.g., 1 hour).
After the passenger alights, drivers can either cruise at the
cost of l (per hour) or park in the garage at the cost of pg
(per hour) subject to parking availability. Let r denote the
average utilization rate of the K parking garages, then the
net hourly wage of the drivers can be written as:
wn = wg +
(l − pg)Kr
N
(3)
To derive equation (3), we note that
λ
Nµ
is the occupancy
rate of the TNC vehicles. If no parking service is provided,
then the variable cost for all vehicles is l per hour. However,
the TNC vehicle would save l − pg (per hour parked) if
the parking rate is lower than the cruising cost. Since the
occupancy rate of the parking garages are r, the total saving
for all TNC drivers are (l − pg)Kr. Therefore each drivers
receives a saving of
(l − pg)Kr
N
.
The total number of drivers N is a function on the net
hourly wage:
N = Fd
(
wg +
(l − pg)Kr
N
)
. (4)
We assume that Fd(·) is an increasing function, so that higher
net wage indicates more supply of TNC drivers. Without loss
of generality, the vehicle variable cost −l is neglected in (4)
as it is a constant.
D. Garage Operator Incentives
The garage operator decides the number of parking spaces
offered to the TNC platform based on the TNC parking
rates and the statistics of the regular parking demand. In
practice, the garage operator should predict the regular
parking demand in the next a few minutes, evaluate how
many parking spaces will be unoccupied, and offer these
parking spaces to the TNC platform. To reduce the exposure,
we assume that this underlying decision process is captured
by a function that specifies the relation between the TNC
parking rate pg and the parking supply K:
K = Fg(rpg) (5)
where rpg is the per hour earning of a parking space offered
to the TNC platform. We assume that Fg is an increasing
function so that higher earnings attract more parking supply.
It is important to note that the utilization rate of TNC
parking space, r, depends on the passenger arrival rate λ,
the number of drivers N , and the number of parking spaces
K. With slight abuse of notation, denote r as r(λ,N,K).
We note that when there are i idle drivers in the system
and i ≥ K, all parking space will be occupied, and r = 1.
However, when i < K, only i out of K parking spaces
are occupied, and the average utilization rate satisfies r =
i/K. In addition, we note that the passenger-driver matching
process is an M/M/N queue. Therefore, the probability that
there are i idle drivers, denoted as Xi, can be derived as:
X0 = pi0
(Nρ)N
N !(1− ρ)
Xi = pi0
(Nρ)N−i
(N − i)! , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1
XN = pi0,
(6)
where ρ =
λ
Nµ
is the occupancy rate of TNC vehicles,
and pi0 is the probability of all drivers being idle in the
ride-hailing market. The expected utilization rate of parking
spaces on the TNC platform is
r(λ,N,K) =
N∑
i=1
Xi min
(
1,
i
K
)
, (7)
where min(a, b) represents the min of a and b.
E. Profit Maximization of the TNC Platform
Consider a TNC platform that charges commission to
make a profit. In this paper, we assume that the platform
charges a commission on the ride-hailing services, but does
not charge a commission on the parking services. We argue
that the TNC platform will refrain from taking commission
from the parking services at least in the early stage of
the proposed business model. In the next section, we will
show that the TNC platform substantially benefits from the
proposed business model even if no commission charge is
directly collected from the parking sector.
In each hour, the platform receives λpf from passengers,
pays wgN to drivers, and keeps the difference to make a
profit. The platform’s profit maximization problem can be
cast as:
max
pf ,wg,pg
λpf − wgN (8)
λ = Fp
(
αtw(N − λ/µ) + pf
)
,
N = Fd
(
wg +
(l − pg)Kr(λ,N,K)
N
)
K = Fg (pgr(λ,N,K)) .
(9)
The overall problem (8) is non-convex due to the nonlinear
constraints. However, since the dimension of the problem is
small, we can solve the globally optimal solution to (8) via
enumerations within sub-second.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
This section discusses the feasibility of the proposed busi-
ness model. We first demonstrate the benefits of the proposed
model through an numerical example using real data from
San Francisco, then we summarize the theoretical result in
Theorem 1, which shows that integrating parking services to
the TNC platform will offer a Pareto improvement, leading
to higher passenger surplus, higher driver surplus, higher
platform profit, and less traffic congestion.
A. Numerical Example
Passengers choose their transport mode based on the total
travel cost c. This can be captured by a logit model, which
can be written as:
λ = λ0
e−c
e−c + e−c0
, (10)
where λ0 is the number of potential passengers (all passen-
gers regardless of their travel mode), and  and c0 are the
model parameters. In our previous work [5], we proved that
the passenger waiting time tw is inversely proportional to
the square root of the number of idle vehicles:
tw =
M√
N − λ/µ. (11)
The underlying intuition of this results is very simple: assume
that all idle vehicles are uniformly distributed across the city.
The passenger waiting time depends on the distance between
the passenger and the closest idle vehicle, which is further
proportional to the distance between any two nearby idle
vehicles. Intuitively, the average distance between any two
nearby idle vehicles is inversely proportional to the square
root of the number of idle vehicles. Our result is consistent
with the empirical data reported in [14].
Drivers choose their work based on the net hourly wage.
Under a logit model, the driver supply function can be
written as:
N = N0
eηwn
eηwn + eηw0
, (12)
where N0 is the number of potential drivers, and η and w0
are the model parameters. Garage operators decide whether
to offer the parking space to the TNC platform based on the
earnings offered by the platform. Assume that each parking
space has a reservation earning, and the garage operator only
offers the parking space if the platform earning e exceeds the
reservation earning. Different parking spaces have distinct
reservation earnings. We assume that the distribution of the
reservation earning is captured by a log-normal distribution.
In this case, the parking supply function Fg can be written
as:
Fg(pgr) = K0
(
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(
ln(pgr)− u0√
2σ
))
(13)
where K0 is all potential idle parking space calculated based
on the arrival and departure pattern of long-term regular
parking demand, erf(·) denotes the error function, and u0
and σ are the model parameters.
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To setup the numerical study, we need to specify the values
of the following parameters:
Θ = {λ0, N0,K0,M, α, , c0, η, w0, σ, u0, l}. (14)
To this end, we consider the following profit maximization
problem without parking services:
max
pf ,wg
λpf − wgN (15)λ = Fp
(
αtw(N − λ/µ) + pf
)
,
N = Fd (wg)
(16)
and we set the parameters values Θ so that the optimal
solution to (15) matches the San Francisco TNC market data.
The values of these parameters are summarized below:
λ0 = 944/min, N0 =10, 000,K0 = 10, 000,M = 174.7,
α = 3,  = 0.155, c0 = 15.48, η = 0.144, w0 = 32.41,
σ = 0.6,u0 = 1.1, l = $8/hour
The detailed justification of these parameters values can be
found in Appendix 1 of [6].
To understand impacts of parking on the TNC business
model, we solve (8) in two steps: first we fix K and derive
other endogenous variables as a function of K, which reflect
how parking provision affects the surplus of passenger,
drivers, garage operators, and the TNC platform; then we
vary K to derive the optimal parking supply that maximizes
the platform profit. Note that K is endogenous and the
platform eventually chooses K that maximizes its profit.
As the number of parking spaces K increases, the average
occupancy of each garage decreases. Therefore, it is easier
for each idle TNC vehicle to find a parking space. This indi-
cates that the occupancy of parking garages is a decreasing
function of K, and the ratio of parked TNC vehicles out
of all idle TNC vehicles is an increasing function of K.
The average occupancy of the TNC parking spaces is shown
in Figure 2. The ratio of parked TNC vehicles is shown in
Figure 3. The number of passengers and drivers as are shown
in Figure 4 and Figure 5, respectively. The passenger travel
cost is shown in Figure 6. The driver gross wage and net
wage are shown in Figure 7, and passenger waiting time is
shown in Figure 8. The passenger ride fare, per-trip driver
payment, and per hour parking rate is shown in Figure 9.
The platform profit is shown in Figure 10. All variables are
represented as functions of K.
Based on Figure 2-10, the optimal solution as a function
of K clearly has three distinct regimes:
• When K ≤ 1272, all parking spaces are fully occupied.
Passengers and drivers are unaffected. Driver savings
from parking the TNC vehicle are reaped by the TNC
platform, who pays a reduced gross wage and enjoys an
increased platform profit. The number of TNC vehicles
on road is reduced, and therefore traffic congestion is
reduced.
• When 1272 ≤ K ≤ 1607, both passengers and drivers
benefit from the parking services. The passenger total
travel cost reduces, the driver net wage increases, more
passenger are delivered, and more drivers are hired. The
number of TNC vehicle on the road network slightly
increases, but is significantly smaller than at K = 0.
The platform profit is maximized at K = 1515.
• When K ≥ 1607, all idle TNC vehicles are parked.
Passenger and drivers are unaffected. The cost due to
over-provision of parking spaces are covered the TNC
platform, who pays an increased gross wage and earns
a reduced profit. Traffic congestion is unaffected.
By comparing the proposed business model with (15), our
numerical study clearly indicates that at the optimal solu-
tion, the proposed business model benefits both passengers,
drivers, garage operators, the TNC platform. In the mean-
while, it reduced the number of TNC vehicles on the road
network, which helps to alleviate the traffic congestion.
B. Analysis
We emphasize that many of the aforementioned insights
hold for a large range of model parameters. For nota-
tion convenience, let λ∗(K), N∗(K), c∗(K), w∗n(K) and
Profit(K) denote the optimal to (8) as a function of K, where
λ∗(K) denotes the passenger arrival rate, N∗(K) denotes the
number of drivers, c∗(K) denotes the passenger travel cost,
w∗n(K) denotes the driver net wage, and Profit(K) represents
the platform profit. Let K∗ denote the profit-maximizing
parking provision. We introduce the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Assume that the profit maximization prob-
lem (8) with exogenous K has a unique solution, then there
exists K1 < K2 < K0 such that
(i) λ∗(K) = λ∗(0), N∗(K) = N∗(0), ∀0 ≤ K ≤ K1,
(ii) λ∗(K) = λ∗(K2), N∗(K) = N∗(K2) , ∀K2 ≤ K ≤ K¯,
(iii) λ∗(K∗) > λ∗(0) and c∗(K∗) < c∗(0)
(iv) N∗(K∗) > N∗(0) and w∗n(K
∗) > w∗n(0),
(v) Profit∗(K∗) > Profit(0).
The proof of Proposition 1 is deferred to the journal version
due to space limit. The assumption of solution uniqueness is
numerically validated and holds for all parameters within
regime of practical interest. In Proposition 1, (i) and (ii)
represents the insight for regime 1 and regime 3, and (iii)-
(v) shows that at the optimal solution K∗, parking services
benefit passengers, drivers and the TNC platform.
In the case study, the optimal number of parking space
is K∗ = 1515. This only accounts for less than 1% of the
166,500 parking spots in the parking garages and commercial
lots of San Francisco (note that K0 denotes the idle parking
spots out of all spots). At this optimal solution, compared
to the case of K = 0, passenger arrival rate increases
by 3.7% (from 150.6/min to 156.2/min), the number of
drivers increases by 5.9% (from 3053 to 3234), the number
of on-road drivers reduces by 43% (from 3053 to 1748),
the passenger travel cost reduces by 0.8% (from 28.83/trip
to 28.61/trip), the driver net hour wage increases by 4%
(from $27.48/hour to $28.58/hour), and the platform profit
increases by 18.6% (from $48,879/hour to $57,981/hour).
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated a novel business model that in-
tegrates parking services in the ride-hailing platform to
reduce cruising congestion of TNC vehicles. The business
model consists of a TNC platform, a group of passengers
and drivers, and a number of parking garages. The plat-
form provides app-based user interfaces that connect the
passengers, drivers, and the parking garages. It matches
passengers to drivers for ride-hailing services, and matches
vacant TNC vehicles to unused parking garages to reduce
cruising costs. The central thesis is that by enabling the
sharing of idle parking spaces between garage operators
and the TNC platform, the proposed business model will
unlock the potential of the unused parking resources to
benefit passengers, drivers, garage operators, and the TNC
platform, and in the meanwhile curb cruising congestion
without affecting regular parking demand.
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